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NOTE
AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION V. BONTA:
THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKING A MAJOR
SOLUTION TO DARK MONEY IN POLITICS
LINDSAY HEMMINGER*
Unlimited spending by the super-wealthy dominates the political arena
yet operates in the shadows.1 The last remaining tool used to bring this
spending to light is at risk of total extinction.2 The result is a significant threat
to the integrity of United States’ democracy.3
In Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta,4 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a California disclosure
requirement compelling tax-exempt charities to disclose to the Attorney
General’s Office Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) forms identifying their
major donors.5 The Court determined that the law was unduly burdensome
on First Amendment associational rights, despite the fact that the donor
information was kept confidential from the public and any identified harms
were minimal and wholly unrelated to the disclosure regime.6 Therefore, the
Court incorrectly held that the disclosure requirement was facially
unconstitutional.7 In doing so, the Court rejected its own precedent and
inappropriately applied an exacting scrutiny standard that required the
disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government interest it
© 2022 Lindsay Hemminger.
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1. See infra Section IV.D.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See infra Section IV.D.
4. 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
5. Id. at 2380.
6. See infra Section IV.C.
7. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2389.
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promotes.8 Additionally, the Court turned its back on its own proclamations
about the importance of preserving disclosure laws in the absence of
significant First Amendment burdens, and it disregarded the significant
protections that disclosure requirements provide in a multitude of contexts.9
By viewing this case in a vacuum, the Court ignored the greater consequences
that its decision will have on disclosure laws for organizations that are
permitted to engage in political activity.10 Without these laws, the
transparency of large amounts of political spending is severely limited,
worsening the decline of public trust in the electoral process.11
After summarizing the law surrounding First Amendment rights and
disclosure laws, this Note supports the dissent’s call for a return to precedent
when applying exacting scrutiny to disclosure requirements.12 Courts should
apply an exacting scrutiny standard that requires the plaintiff to show that
there is a substantial relationship between the disclosure law and a
sufficiently important government interest.13 When they apply this standard,
they must appropriately weigh the government interests in enacting such laws
with harms that actually result from their enforcement.14 Justice Sotomayor
correctly mentioned that, because the Court’s holding is not exclusive to
disclosure requirements for 501(c)(3) charities, any organization subjected to
disclosure laws will likely see the Bonta holding as a green light to
successfully challenge them.15 Because the new exacting scrutiny standard
is the functional equivalent of strict scrutiny, it will be incredibly difficult for
states to prevail in court.16 However, the dissent failed to acknowledge the
breadth of consequences the Court’s holding is likely to have on the integrity
of United States’ elections and the democratic process.17
This Note aims to expand on the dissenters’ concerns by emphasizing
the important role that disclosure laws play in maintaining transparency of
big spending in politics.18 It argues that the uber-wealthy’s financial
influence on American politics is one of the largest threats to democracy,
though it is rarely discussed in the media.19 This Note recommends that the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 2384.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
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Court return to an exacting scrutiny standard that does not require narrow
tailoring, not simply to protect disclosure laws that aim to police charitable
fraud, but also to provide states the ability to combat the improper influences
of dark money in their elections.20
I. THE CASE
California officials conducted investigations into Thomas More Law
Center (“the Law Center”) and Americans for Prosperity Foundation (“the
Foundation”), the petitioners, for unlawful charitable activity.21 Petitioners
are 501(c)(3) organizations that focus on direct issue advocacy.22 The Law
Center was founded to “restore and defend America’s Judeo-Christian
heritage by represent[ing] people who promote Roman Catholic values,
marriage and family matters, freedom from government interference in
[religion] and opposition to the imposition of Sharia law within the United
States.”23 The Foundation was founded in 1987 to “further[] free enterprise,
free society-type issues,” and they hold conferences, publish policy papers,
and develop educational programs to “promote the benefits of a free
market.”24 Since 2001, both organizations had consistently failed to comply
with a California requirement to disclose their contributors to the California
Attorney General, though they did submit a complete Schedule B25 with the
IRS.26 The Registry Unit, a faction of the Charitable Trusts Section of the
California Department of Justice, is responsible for overseeing the
registration and renewal processes of charity organizations.27 In 2012 and
2013, the Registry Unit informed both organizations of their deficiency in
submitting the Schedule B information.28
Rather than complying with the Attorney General’s demands, the Law
Center and the Foundation separately filed suit in the Central District of
California.29 Both organizations contended that the Schedule B requirement
was unconstitutional because it burdened their First Amendment right to free

20. See infra Part IV.
21. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2380 (2021).
22. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2018).
23. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id.
25. Schedule B to Form 990 “requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses of
donors who have contributed more than $5,000 in a particular tax year” or who have donated “more
than 2 percent of an organization’s total contributions.” Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2380.
26. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1006.
27. Id. at 1005–06.
28. Id. at 1006.
29. Id.
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association by deterring donors from contributing to their organizations.30
The organizations filed motions for a preliminary injunction, and the district
court granted their requests, finding that “they had raised serious questions
going to the merits of their cases and demonstrated that the balance of
hardships tipped in their favor.”31
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and
remanded the case, holding that it was bound by precedent to reject the
organizations’ constitutional challenges.32 The Ninth Circuit applied an
exacting scrutiny standard33 and held that the petitioners failed to show any
actual burden on their First Amendment rights as a result of the Attorney
General’s requirement to collect the Schedule B forms for nonpublic use.34
Thus, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the injunction, “enjoining the Attorney
General . . . from making Schedule B information public” and allowing the
collection and usage of the Schedule B forms for enforcement purposes.35
On remand, the district court, again, found for the petitioners and
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from
collecting the organizations’ Schedule Bs.36 The court applied exacting
scrutiny that required narrow tailoring.37 The court held that, because the
Attorney General rarely used Schedule B forms to audit or investigate
charities and the State could obtain the information provided on the forms
elsewhere, the disclosure requirement “was not narrowly tailored to the
State’s interest in investigating . . . misconduct.”38 Additionally, the district
court found that the disclosure requirements burdened the associational rights
of donors because, in both cases, members of the organizations had received
threats and harassing calls, and the potential for future retaliation was great
if donor or member affiliations became public knowledge.39 However, it was
unclear if the harassment was a direct consequence of donor disclosure,
considering the Attorney General’s policy was to keep the Schedule B
information confidential.40 Nevertheless, the district court found that the
State was not capable of ensuring the confidentiality of the donor information
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2380–81 (2021) (citing Ams. for
Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 809 F.3d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
33. See infra Section II.C for an explanation of the exacting scrutiny standard.
34. Harris, 809 F.3d at 538, 542.
35. Id. at 543.
36. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2381.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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because the Attorney General had mistakenly posted confidential Schedule
B information to its website in the past.41 Despite the fact that California had
“codified a policy prohibiting [public] disclosure,” the district court found it
reasonable that donors and potential donors feared disclosure.42
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the
district court erred in applying a narrow tailoring standard.43 The Ninth
Circuit applied an exacting scrutiny standard that required a substantial
relationship between the law and a sufficiently important government
interest.44 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that the collection of Schedule
Bs was necessary to provide efficient and effective investigations into charity
misconduct, despite the fact that the Attorney General could obtain Schedule
B information by other means.45 The court also held that the Foundation and
the Law Center failed to show that compliance with the requirement would
significantly burden donors’ associational rights, or, more specifically,
“meaningfully deter contributions.”46 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the risk of public disclosure was slight due to the Attorney General’s
implementation of stronger protocols to prevent breaches of confidentiality.47
Thus, the court held that the California law “survive[d] exacting First
Amendment scrutiny,”48 and denied a rehearing en banc.49 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether California’s
Schedule B disclosure requirement violated the First Amendment right to free
association.50
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, protects the right to associate with others.51
The compelled disclosure of one’s affiliation with advocacy groups may
constrain freedoms of association in certain circumstances.52 In Americans
for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, the Supreme Court of the United States
applied an exacting scrutiny standard that required narrow tailoring to strike
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1011–12.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1020.
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2382 (2021).
Id. at 2379.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (NAACP v. Alabama), 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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down a California disclosure requirement that compelled charitable
organizations to file copies of their IRS Form 990 and Schedule B documents
with the Attorney General.53 Such documents required the disclosure of
“names and addresses of donors who . . . contributed more than $5,000” in
any given tax year.54 Section II.A explores the associational rights vested in
the First Amendment.55 Section II.B discusses the California disclosure law
and federal disclosure requirements.56 Section II.C sets forth the different
standards of scrutiny the Court uses to assess the constitutionality of laws and
evaluates the application of scrutiny in First Amendment challenges.57
Lastly, Section II.D evaluates facial challenges to legislative acts.58
A. The First Amendment and Associational Rights
The First Amendment prohibits the government from “abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”59 The
Court has recognized that the right to freely associate with others is implied
in the First Amendment.60 More specifically, the First Amendment implicitly
protects the right to freedom of political association.61 According to the
Supreme Court, the right to free association is “fundamental and highly
prized,”62 and it “need[s] breathing space to survive.”63 This means that laws
may not be vague, overbroad, or too burdensome on associational rights.64
The Court contends that the protection of this right allows for the “unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.”65 Individuals and organizations are protected from
governmental actions that discourage the exercise of associational freedoms,
53. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2380.
54. Id.
55. See infra Section II.A.
56. See infra Section II.B.
57. See infra Section II.C.
58. See infra Section II.D.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
61. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas”); see also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (affirming that the First Amendment protects the right
to engage freely in political associations); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973) (same);
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2004) (same); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2007) (same).
62. Gibson v. Fl. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963).
63. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
64. Id.
65. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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even where such actions seem wholly unrelated to constitutionally protected
political rights.66 Revealing political associations by requiring organizations
to disclose their donors may constitute a governmental action that stifles First
Amendment associational rights.67 Similarly, requiring individuals to
disclose their political ties may also suppress First Amendment rights.68
Disclosure of associational ties has the potential to deter individuals from
exercising political expression and could cause individuals to refrain from
contributing to or becoming a member of certain groups and organizations,
especially when disclosure subjects him or her to threats, harassment or
reprisals.69 Because First Amendment rights “need breathing space to
survive,” governments may enact such regulations “only with narrow
specificity.”70
B. Disclosure Requirements
1. Disclosure Requirements Generally
Disclosure requirements come in various forms for various purposes.71
Though subjected to restraints, states and municipalities may enact laws that
require that organizations disclose the identity of its members or its
contributors.72 Federal and state campaign laws may include requirements to
disclose contributions made to candidates for federal office,73 signatory
information on referendum petitions,74 and the identity of any entity
responsible for funding electioneering communications.75 The Court has

66. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960) (“Freedoms such as [freedom of association] are protected not only against heavyhanded frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.”).
67. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2389 (2021).
68. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982) (“The Constitution protects against compelled disclosure of
political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures ‘can seriously infringe on privacy of association
and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)
(per curiam)).
69. See e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461–63 (holding that “[c]ompelled disclosure of
membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs” may create a “deterrent
effect” on an individual’s freedom to exercise his or her “constitutionally protected right of
association”).
70. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
71. See infra notes 72–96 and accompanying text.
72. See Ctr. for Competitive Pols. v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
California’s disclosure law requiring organizations to disclose donor names to the Attorney General
did not violate the First Amendment).
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976) (per curiam).
74. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 192 (2010).
75. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010).
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identified several governmental interests in the enactment of disclosure
laws.76 For example, states enact disclosure laws that inform the public of
large contributions with the goal of deterring corruption and “avoid[ing] the
appearance of corruption.”77 Additionally, disclosure laws are used for
recordkeeping and reporting and serve as a means of “gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations [set forth by
law].”78
A state may also wish to promote transparency among the electorate and
inform them as to where political campaign money originates and how a
candidate spends the funds.79 The Supreme Court highlighted this point in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.80 That case grappled with
a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,81 which
prohibited corporations and unions from using general funds to make direct
contributions to political candidates or independent expenditures that
advocated for the election or defeat of a candidate through any form of
media.82 However, corporations and unions were allowed to establish
“‘separate segregated fund[s]’” known as political action committees
(“PACs”) through which they could fund electioneering communications.83
PACs could receive donations from stockholders and employees of the
corporation or members of the union.84 Citizens United planned to air a
movie that criticized Hillary Clinton ahead of the 2008 election but feared
that the film and the advertisements would violate the Act.85 Citizens United
alleged that the ban on electoral spending infringed on their First Amendment
right to political speech, while the Government argued that limiting corporate
political speech through spending restrictions prevented corruption.86 The
Court held that the Government had no constitutional basis to limit corporate
independent expenditures in elections and invalidated Section 441b.87 The
Government is not permitted to suppress political speech by imposing limits
on outside spending on political campaigns.88 Despite removing the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
§ 441b.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68.
Id.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 66.
558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010).
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366.
Id. at 321. Electioneering communications include political advertisements. 2 U.S.C.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 365.
Id.
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limitations on corporate election spending, the Court acknowledged that
disclosure requirements were imperative to ensuring the integrity and
transparency of that spending.89 The Court assured that “prompt disclosure
of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters.”90 More specifically, disclosure laws allow citizens
to “see whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed
interests.”91
Congress has also considered the importance of maintaining
transparency in political spending through disclosure requirements.92
Congressman John Sarbanes, who represents Maryland’s Third District,
introduced the For the People Act in January of 2021.93 The bill would
require any corporation, union, nonprofit, or similar organization spending
more than $10,000 per election cycle to disclose all donors who contributed
at least $10,000.94 Additionally, the bill would require these organizations to
disclose all campaign-related disbursements above $1,000, the name of the
candidate supported or opposed by the disbursement, and a certification that
the spending was not coordinated with any candidate.95 Organizations could
refrain from disclosing donor information if disclosure would subject the
donor to serious threats of harassment or reprisal.96 The Act passed in the
House of Representatives on March 3, 2021, and it awaits approval in the
Senate.97 As of August 11, 2021, the bill has been placed on the Senate
Legislative Calendar at number 123.98
2. Federal Disclosure Requirements
Federal disclosure requirements date back to 1910 when Congress first
enacted a law requiring political campaign committees and “organizations
operating to influence congressional elections in two or more States[] to

89. Id. at 370–71.
90. Id. at 370.
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 259 (2003)) .
92. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
93. For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
94. Id. § 4111.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. H.R.1 – For the People Act of 2021, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/house-bill/1/text (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
98. S.1 – For the People Act of 2021, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/senate-bill/1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
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disclose” the identities of all donors who contributed $100 or more.99 Since
then, Congress has expanded disclosure requirements to increase public
transparency of campaign contributions.100
Federal disclosure requirements apply differently depending on an
entity’s tax status.101 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) applies different
rules to individuals; businesses; the self-employed; charities; nonprofits;
international taxpayers; government liaisons; federal, state, or local
governments; and Indian tribal governments.102 Charities and organizations
are further categorized: Charitable organizations, churches and religious
organizations, and private foundations most often qualify for tax-exempt
status under Section 501(c)(3),103 while political organizations are
nonexempt entities subject to Section 527.104 Section 501(c)(3) organizations
are “prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in . . . political
campaign[s].105 These organizations may only conduct election-related
activities in a non-partisan manner.106 Social welfare organizations are also
tax-exempt, but these organizations may engage in some political activities
such as lobbying or political campaign activities, as long as that is not their
primary activity.107
Tax-exempt organizations, nonexempt charitable trusts, and Section
527 political organizations must submit a Form 990 to the IRS.108 Form 990
contains information about an organization’s mission, leadership, finances,
and contributions, but it does not ask for names of contributors or
members.109 An organization’s completed Form 990 is generally available
for public inspection as required by Section 6104.110 Organizations that have
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61 (1976) (per curiam).
100. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (requiring political organizations to disclose donor and
expenditure information in an array of circumstances).
101. See infra notes 102–118 and accompanying text.
102. File, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 14, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/filing.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
104. Id. § 527; Exempt Organization Types, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 1, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-organization-types.
105. The Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt
Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/charitable-organizations/the-restriction-of-political-campaign-intervention-by-section501c3-tax-exempt-organizations.
106. Id.
107. Social Welfare Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 7, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/social-welfare-organizations.
108. Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2020),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990.
109. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 (2021),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 6104.
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“over $1,500 of taxable interest or ordinary dividends” are also required to
submit a Schedule B or Form 1040.111 Schedule B requires 501(c)(3)
organizations to disclose to the IRS the names and addresses of all donors
who have contributed $5,000 or more during the taxable year if the amount
exceeds two percent of the total contributions received by the organization
during that year.112 However, a tax-exempt organization under 501(c)(3) is
not required to publicly disclose “the names or addresses of its contributors”
on its annual return, including in its Schedule B.113 This does not apply to
private foundations under Section 509114 or political organizations under
Section 527,115 which include political parties, campaign committees of
candidates for federal, state or local office, and political action committees.116
Political organizations must make the names of any person that contributes
$200 or more in a given calendar available to the public.117 Section 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations, on the other hand, are not required to disclose
the names of significant donors on their Schedule B to their Form 990, despite
their ability to engage in some political activity.118
3. California Disclosure Laws
California enacted a law that provided the Attorney General with the
authority to “establish and maintain a register of charitable corporations” and
“conduct whatever investigation is necessary.”119 To assist in maintaining a
register, the law required that every charitable organization file “an initial
registration form, under oath, setting forth information and attaching
documents prescribed in accordance with rules and regulations of the

111. About Schedule B (Form 1040), Interest and Ordinary Dividends, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-schedule-b-form-1040.
112. U.S. DEP’T TREAS., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE B (2021),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf; 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(f), 1.6033-2(a)(2)(iii)
(2020).
113. Public Disclosure and Availability of Exempt Organizations Returns and Applications:
Contributors’ Identities Not Subject to Disclosure, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sep. 7, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/public-disclosure-and-availability-of-exemptorganizations-returns-and-applications-contributors-identities-not-subject-to-disclosure
[hereinafter Public Disclosure of Exempt Organizations].
114. 26 U.S.C. § 509.
115. Id. § 527; Public Disclosure of Exempt Organizations, supra note 113.
116. Tax Information for Political Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/political-organizations.
117. Public Disclosure of Exempt Organizations, supra note 113.
118. Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt
Organizations, 85 Fed. Reg. 31959, 31959–69 (May 28, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1,
56).
119. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12584 (West 2018).

1018

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1007

Attorney General.”120 The Attorney General was authorized to adopt and
enforce rules and regulations regarding the registration forms.121 Charitable
organizations were required to file periodic written reports that included
information about their charitable assets and administrative procedures.122
Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General required that every taxexempt charitable corporation report IRS Form 990 with all attachments and
schedules in the same form as filed with the IRS.123
C. Standard of Scrutiny in Challenges of Disclosure Laws
1. Determining the Appropriate Standard
In the 1958 case of National Association of the Advancement of Colored
People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (“NAACP v. Alabama”),124 the Supreme
Court confronted a First Amendment challenge to a law requiring charitable
organizations to publicly disclose the names of all its members, but it did not
specify which standard of review should apply in such cases.125 The Court
simply stated that “state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”126
When a plaintiff challenges a law, the lowest level of scrutiny that a
Court may apply is the rational basis test.127 Under the rational basis test, a
law is constitutional so long as a rational person might believe the law is more
often than not rational, or, the instances where the law is rational are more
important than the instances where it is not.128 However, when legislation is
inconsistent with the plain text of the Constitution, interferes with democratic
or political processes, or violates the rights of “discreet and insular
minorities,” the Court is inclined to ratchet up the scrutiny.129 In some
instances, the Court may apply an intermediate scrutiny, which requires that
the government establish that the law serves an important state interest that
120. Id. §12585(a).
121. Id. §12585(b).
122. Id. §12586(a).
123. CAL. CODE. REGS., tit. 11 § 301 (2020).
124. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
125. See id. at 451.
126. Id. at 460–61 (emphasis added).
127. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (analyzing whether the
regulation had a “rational relation” to an articulated objective).
128. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (stating that a
regulation will survive rational basis scrutiny only if it “rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
129. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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is “substantially related” to those objectives.130 In other circumstances, the
Court may deem it necessary to apply strict scrutiny, a more demanding
standard, which requires the government to show that the law serves a
compelling government interest and is a necessary or “narrowly tailored”
means of achieving its goals.131
When confronting a First Amendment challenge, courts apply different
levels of scrutiny depending on whether the regulation is content-neutral or
content-based.132 Content-based laws, which “single[] out specific subject
matter for differential treatment,”133 are subject to strict scrutiny.134
Viewpoint-based laws, which attempt to regulate one side of a political
controversy, are also subject to strict scrutiny.135 Where a regulation is based
on the content of the speech or on the viewpoint of the speaker, the Court
scrutinizes it more carefully “to ensure that communication has not been
prohibited ‘merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s
views.’”136 On the other hand, content-neutral laws are typically subject to
an intermediate level of scrutiny because they impose only “an incidental
burden on speech.”137
In order to survive a First Amendment challenge under strict scrutiny,
the “Government [must] prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”138 To achieve
narrow tailoring, the government must adopt “the least restrictive means
[necessary to achieve] a compelling state interest.”139 This requirement
130. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
131. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to racial
classifications, which “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests”); Johnson v. California, 542 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (same); Parents Involved
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (same).
132. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (“The Court’s
precedents allow the government to ‘constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations’ on speech, but the precedents restrict the government from discriminating ‘in the
regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression.’” (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976))).
133. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).
134. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2346.
135. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).
136. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
137. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994).
138. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). “Laws that burden political speech
are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))
(applying strict scrutiny to ‘[l]aws that burden political speech”).
139. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
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prevents a statute from sweeping too broadly and inhibiting protected
freedoms outside of the public interest it seeks to meet.140 Alternatively,
intermediate scrutiny in the First Amendment context requires that the law
further an important or substantial government interest that is not related to
the suppression of free expression and is narrowly tailored such that the
regulation does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.”141 Intermediate scrutiny is a
slightly less burdensome standard to meet, as it does not require a state to
adopt the least restrictive law to achieve its goals.142
Since NAACP v. Alabama, the Court has consistently applied what is
known as exacting scrutiny to First Amendment associational challenges, a
standard that is often considered less restrictive than strict scrutiny but
slightly more restrictive than intermediate scrutiny.143 In Buckley v. Valeo,144
the Court addressed a challenge to a law requiring election candidates to
publicly disclose contributions and expenditures above a certain threshold.145
The Court applied exacting scrutiny and required the government to show
more than a legitimate governmental interest.146 There must be a “relevant
correlation” or “substantial relation” between the governmental interest and
the information that the government requires an organization to disclose.147
The Court reinforced this standard in Doe v. Reed,148 citing to its precedential
cases considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in
the electoral context.149 The Court made clear that, to survive this scrutiny,
140. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (“A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets
and eliminates no more than the exact source of ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” (quoting City Council of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808–10 (1984))).
141. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
799 (1989)).
142. Id.
143. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (“Since NAACP v. Alabama we
have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.”); Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (“We have a series of precedents considering First Amendment
challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral context. These precedents have reviewed such
challenges under what has been termed ‘exacting scrutiny.’”); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554
U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (“[W]e have closely scrutinized disclosure requirements . . . . [T]here must
be a relevant correlation or substantial relation between the governmental interest and the
information required to be disclosed, and the governmental interest must survive exacting scrutiny.”
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 64.
147. Id.
148. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
149. Id. at 196 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 366 (2010); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008); Buckley v. Am.
Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999)).
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“the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual burden on First Amendment rights.”150
In First Amendment challenges of laws that restrict political or
professional speech, the Court has applied a form of exacting scrutiny that
also requires that the restriction be narrowly tailored, a more stringent
standard to meet.151 The Court also required narrow tailoring in McCutcheon
v. Federal Election Commission,152 which involved laws limiting
contributions to political candidates.153 However, the Court has explicitly
stated that “disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they
‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities’154 and ‘do not prevent
anyone from speaking.’”155 Thus, the Court has historically refrained from
requiring narrow tailoring for disclosure requirements.156 Despite these
precedents, there is an existing contention as to whether laws compelling
disclosure of an organizations’ members or contributors requires narrow
tailoring.157
2. Application of Exacting Scrutiny to Disclosure Laws
When applying the exacting scrutiny standard to associational
challenges to determine a law’s constitutionality, the Court engages in a
balancing of governmental interests and the actual burden on First
Amendment.158 In NAACP v. Alabama, the challenged law required the
150. Id. (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 744).
151. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015); see, e.g., Nat’l Inst. Family & Life
Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (“Content-based regulations [that] ‘target speech
based on its communicative content’ . . . ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’”
(quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015))); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting
scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest.”).
152. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
153. Id. at 218.
154. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)).
155. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)).
156. See id. at 366–67 (“The Court has subjected these requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny,’
which requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently
important’ governmental interest.” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66)).
157. Compare Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383–84 (2021) (stating
that exacting scrutiny always requires narrow tailoring), with Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,
141 S. Ct. 2373, 2398 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that exacting scrutiny does not
necessarily require narrow tailoring).
158. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (“To withstand [exacting] scrutiny, ‘the strength
of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.’” (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008))).
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) to
disclose the names of its members to the Alabama Attorney General, which
exposed them to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion,” and other forms of public hostility.159 The Court reasonably
concluded that the threats could prompt members to disassociate from the
NAACP and dissuade others from joining, and these harms were not
outweighed by any state interest in compelling disclosure.160 Similarly, in
Shelton v. Tucker,161 the disclosure requirement compelled all public school
teachers to submit a list of every organization to which they belonged or
contributed to in the state of Arkansas, which included the NAACP.162 The
Court first established that the state had a right to “investigate the competence
and fitness of those” it hired as teachers, and thus, there was a substantially
relevant correlation between the governmental interest and the law.163 Next,
the Court evaluated the disclosure law’s impairment on teachers’
associational rights and deemed that the burden was significant because the
disclosure was public and used to make hiring decisions each year.164
Because the Court determined that the harms were so substantial in this case,
it required the state to prove that the law was narrowly tailored to the interest
it sought to promote.165 The Supreme Court has made clear that an evaluation
of the burdens and harms on personal liberties that result from the challenged
law is vital to the exacting scrutiny analysis.166
D. Appropriateness of Facial Challenges to Disclosure Regimes
A facial challenge to a congressional act requires that the challenger
show “that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be
valid.”167 A court may invalidate a law that abridges First Amendment
freedoms if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”168 However,
courts are hesitant to rule that a law is facially unconstitutional because
“[c]laims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation.”169 As a result, courts
159. 357 U.S. 449, 451, 462 (1958).
160. Id. at 463.
161. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
162. Id. at 480–81.
163. Id. at 485.
164. Id. at 485–86.
165. Id. at 488.
166. Id. at 488.
167. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
168. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).
169. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450.
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run the risk of prematurely interpreting statutes without a factual record to
prove that future applications will present the same First Amendment
issues.170 Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that facial challenges
undermine “the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.”171 Facial
challenges also threaten ideals of federalism—they undermine the
democratic process in which the people elect their representatives to create
laws “in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”172 Thus, a court should
not anticipate future questions of constitutional law nor should it rule outside
the scope of the specific facts in front of it.173
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that
California’s disclosure law, which demanded the submission of Schedule B
forms to the Attorney General, was facially unconstitutional.174 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court created a new version of the exacting scrutiny
standard that required narrow tailoring and determined that, in every
application, the disclosure regime could not stand.175 Justice Alito and
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.176 Writing for the dissent, Justice
Sotomayor criticized the majority’s departure from precedent when it set a
new standard for disclosure requirements.177 The dissent argued that the
disclosure regime was constitutional, even under the restraints of the
majority’s exacting scrutiny standard, and, thus, should have survived both
the as-applied and facial challenges.178
First, the Court addressed the Law Center’s argument that a strict
scrutiny standard should apply because it would better protect the
associational rights of charities, while the exacting scrutiny standard is
reserved for the electoral context.179 Based on its interpretation of precedent,
the Court decided that exacting scrutiny did apply to First Amendment
challenges to compelled disclosure and was not exclusively reserved for
electoral disclosure laws.180 The Law Center and the Foundation argued that
even if exacting scrutiny applied, the standard should incorporate the least
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 450–51.
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2389 (2021).
Id. at 2384, 2387.
Id. at 2391–92 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2389–91 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2392, 2401.
Id. at 2383 (majority opinion).
Id.
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restrictive means test.181 To the contrary, the Attorney General argued that
exacting scrutiny should not require any more tailoring than the substantial
relationship test required.182 The Court determined that exacting scrutiny
does not require that the disclosure requirement be the least restrictive means
to achieve the desired goal.183 However, the requirement must be narrowly
tailored to the government’s declared interest in order to account for the
potential First Amendment harms that could result from requiring a charitable
organization to disclose its donors.184
The Foundation and the Law Center’s primary argument was that the
obligation to disclose Schedule Bs to the Attorney General was facially
unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to them.185 Regarding the
as-applied claim, the Court explained that, under the exacting scrutiny
standard, the disclosure requirement must have a substantial relation to a
sufficiently important government interest and must be narrowly tailored to
the interest it promotes.186 The Court reasoned that, although protecting the
public from charitable fraud was a significant government interest, the
disclosure rule did not meet the narrow tailoring requirement because
Schedule B collection did not serve an integral part in “investigative,
regulatory or enforcement efforts.”187 The Attorney General argued that
alternatives to obtain Schedule B information were insufficient and
ineffective.188 However, the Court noted that the record showed that
California had not considered any of the plentiful alternatives to disclosure
requirements.189 Because it seemed that the objective of the disclosure
requirement was to ease administrative duties rather than to initiate
investigations into charitable fraud, the Court held that the burden on the
donors’ associational rights outweighed California’s interests in collecting
Schedule B information.190
Next, the Court responded to the Attorney General’s argument that the
burden on donors was not so severe as to result in “any broad-based
chill[ing]” of their associational rights.191 The Court reasoned that because
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2385.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2385–86 (quoting Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 1049, 1055
(C.D. Cal. 2016).
188. Id. at 2386.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2387.
191. Id. 2387–88.
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the law was not tailored to California’s investigative goal, in every instance
in which it collected Schedule B forms, each demand for Schedule B
disclosure might “chill association.”192 Thus, the Court determined that the
law was unconstitutionally overbroad.193
The Court was not persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument that,
because Schedule B information is confidential and must be reported to the
IRS, there was no broad-based chill on association.194 The Court reasoned
that exacting scrutiny is triggered by a disclosure requirement that presents
even the possibility of curtailing the freedom to associate, and the promises
of confidentiality do not eliminate such possibility.195
The Court
acknowledged the petitioner’s evidence that they and their supporters had
faced “bomb threats, protests, stalking, and physical violence.”196 The Court
reiterated that a plaintiff is not required to show that the requirement would
subject “donors to a substantial number of organizations” to harassment since
the requirement was not narrowly tailored to a significant government
interest.197 Thus, the Court concluded that the disclosure requirement’s
burden on associational rights could not be justified on the basis that it was
narrowly tailored to investigate fraud or provide administrative
convenience.198 The mere risk of a chilling effect on association is enough
to withstand a First Amendment facial challenge.199
Writing in concurrence, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, agreed
that the disclosure requirement failed exacting scrutiny.200 However, Justice
Alito thought that it was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether exacting
or strict scrutiny should apply in all cases in which a petitioner challenges the
disclosure of associations under the First Amendment.201 Justice Thomas
also concurred in the judgment, but he stated that precedent required that the
strict scrutiny standard apply to disclosure laws that impact First Amendment
associational rights.202 He criticized the majority’s conclusion that
compelled disclosure laws were facially invalid in all circumstances because
192. Id. at 2388.
193. See id. (“The disclosure requirement ‘creates an unnecessary risk of chilling’ in violation
of the First Amendment, indiscriminately sweeping up the information of every major donor with
reason to remain anonymous.” (quoting Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968
(1984))).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2389 (emphasis added).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2389–90 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the Court lacked the authority “to enjoin the lawful application of a statute”
on the grounds that it may be unlawful in other circumstances.203 In Justice
Thomas’s view, courts do not have the appropriate authority to solve the legal
issues of individuals who have not come before them.204 However, Justice
Thomas concurred that the law was unconstitutional as applied to
Petitioners.205
Writing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer and
Justice Kagan,206 concluded that Supreme Court precedent required plaintiffs
to show that the disclosure requirement was likely to expose their donors and
supporters to definite consequences in order to establish an actual burden.207
Only then could the Court apply a “means-end tailoring proportional to that
burden.”208 The dissent was troubled by the Court’s interpretation of
precedent when it held that disclosure regimes require narrow tailoring,
especially because the Court failed to demand a strong showing of
associational burdens.209 Justice Sotomayor criticized the Court’s holding as
presuming “that all disclosure requirements impose associational
burdens.”210
Even considering this new “‘one size fits all’ test,” the dissent would
have held that California’s Schedule B requirement was constitutional
because the petitioners did not show that the nonpublic reporting requirement
would burden their associational rights.211 Justice Sotomayor emphasized
that the petitioners failed to establish any burdens that would result directly
from the law, in part because the law kept the donor information confidential
from the public and only allowed state officials to access it.212 Thus, because
the First Amendment burden was slight, California was merely required to
make a modest showing that the law achieved its governmental interests.213
The dissent would have held that the reporting requirement was properly
tailored to achieve California’s efforts to monitor charitable fraud, and it
would be unreasonable for officials to obtain this information by alternative
means.214
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 2390 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2391.
Id. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2394.
Id.
Id. at 2398.
Id. at 2395.
Id. at 2398.
Id. at 2400.
Id.
Id. at 2402.
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The dissent noted that the Court inappropriately struck down the
requirement in all applications, despite the lack of evidence showing that it
would chill a substantial number of donors from giving to charities.215 The
dissenters suggested that average donors likely have no feelings about having
their information confidentially reported to the Attorney General and pointed
to studies showing that “the vast majority of donors prefer to publicize their
charitable contributions.”216 In the event that an organization is unpopular or
controversial, confidentiality measures are adequate to safeguard against any
retaliation or threat from the public.217 The dissent rebuked the Court for
turning its back on its longstanding recognition that disclosure requirements
do not directly interfere with First Amendment rights and for invalidating a
regulation entirely without significant evidence to show that it is likely to
burden associational rights of a substantial proportion of donors.218 Justice
Sotomayor warned that the Court’s decision “mark[ed] reporting and
disclosure requirements with a bull’s-eye.”219
IV. ANALYSIS
The holding in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta was the
result of the Supreme Court’s decision to deny deference to state legislatures
in enacting laws that protect the public interest.220 The Court inappropriately
applied the overbreadth doctrine, setting the stage for a national attack on
disclosure requirements for all types of organizations.221 As the dissent
noted, the majority created a standard that deems disclosure requirements a
direct burden on associational rights and makes it difficult for any disclosure
requirements to stand, regardless of whether the harms to personal liberties
are minimal.222 In doing so, the Court inadequately considered the significant
governmental interests involved in enacting disclosure requirements for
charitable organizations, which include preventing charitable fraud and
maintaining transparency in charitable spending.223
What the Justices in both the dissent and the majority failed to recognize
is that this decision has implications for election spending, as well,

215. Id. at 2403.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2404.
218. Id. at 2405.
219. Id. at 2392.
220. See infra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
221. See Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2388.
222. See id. at 2384–85 (“Because, in the dissent’s view, the petitioners have not shown such a
[severe] burden here, narrow tailoring is not required.”).
223. See id. at 2385.
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considering that many organizations subject to disclosure engage in political
campaign activity.224
Mandating disclosure of an organization’s
expenditures and contributors not only prevents charitable fraud, but informs
the public about its political interests and any connections it may have to
elected officials.225 Without it, election spending by wealthy individuals and
organizations remains in the dark.226 By failing to narrow its holding to
501(c)(3) organizations, the Court places all disclosure laws for both political
and non-political organizations in jeopardy, stripping states of their last
remaining avenue for combating dark money in politics.227
This Analysis section will proceed as follows. First, Section IV.A
challenges the Court’s departure from precedent when determining the scope
and application of the exacting scrutiny standard.228 Then, Section IV.B
highlights the Court’s failure to give proper weight to state governmental
interests in enacting disclosure requirements.229 Next, Section IV.C
emphasizes the need for litigants to demonstrate legitimate harms and
advocates for applying the precedential balancing test when analyzing
challenges to disclosure requirements.230 Finally, Section IV.D highlights the
devastating consequences that the Bonta Court’s application of the
overbreadth doctrine has for the integrity of democratic elections.231
A. The Reed Rejection: Departing From Past Precedent in Applying an
Altered Exacting Scrutiny Standard
The Court erred when it failed to apply the exacting scrutiny balancing
test set forth in Doe v. Reed and other precedential cases involving First
Amendment associational challenges to disclosure requirements.232 In Doe
v. Reed, the Supreme Court applied exacting scrutiny, requiring “a substantial
relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important
governmental interest.”233 Rather than follow its precedent, the Bonta Court
incorrectly added that exacting scrutiny requires that disclosure regimes “be
narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest.”234
224. See infra Section IV.D.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See infra Section IV.A.
229. See infra Section IV.B.
230. See infra Section IV.C.
231. See infra Section IV.D.
232. See supra Section II.C.2.
233. 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010)).
234. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2383.
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In requiring narrow tailoring, the Court relied on an erroneous
interpretation of Shelton v. Tucker.235 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her
dissent, the Bonta majority “cherry-picked”236 Shelton’s proposition that
“even a ‘legitimate and substantial’ governmental interest ‘cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved.’”237 In Bonta, the Court interpreted this to mean
that the government may only regulate the First Amendment with narrow
specificity, in all circumstances.238 This interpretation was incorrect.239 The
Shelton Court did not hold that narrow tailoring was always necessary for a
disclosure regime to survive.240 Rather, the Shelton Court reasoned that
narrow tailoring was necessary because of the extreme burden that the
requirement in that case imposed.241
In Shelton, the challenged law required teachers to disclose a list of
“every conceivable kind of associational tie” to the state.242 The Court noted
that “such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher’s
occupational competence or fitness.”243 The Court concluded that “even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”244 The Court simply held that
the law went “far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s
legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers.”245 It was
only because Arkansas’ attempt to ensure teachers were qualified seriously
infringed on First Amendment rights that the Court demanded Arkansas more
narrowly achieve its interest.246 At no point did the Court suggest that all
disclosure laws must be narrowly tailored in the absence of significant
associational burdens.247 The Bonta Court failed to recognize this important
concept, and erroneously decided that narrow tailoring is required in all
235. See id.
236. Id. at 2398 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 2384 (majority opinion) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
238. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2385.
239. See id. at 2398 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (refuting the majority’s interpretation of
Shelton).
240. Id. at 2398 n.5.
241. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 490.
246. See id. (“The statute’s comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far
beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate inquiry into the fitness and
competency of its teachers.”).
247. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2397 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.

1030

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1007

instances in which a disclosure requirement is challenged, regardless of the
gravity of the burden on personal liberties.248
The Court also incorrectly relied on its precedent in McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Commission,249 which applied an exacting scrutiny standard
that required narrow tailoring to political contribution limits.250 As Justice
Sotomayor pointed out, the Court already established a clear difference
between its approach to laws that limit political contributions and disclosure
laws.251 In relying on these distinguishable cases, the Court, again, failed to
follow its precedent in Reed and, instead, created a more stringent rule
requiring that all disclosure regimes be narrowly tailored, no matter if the
associational burdens are nonexistent or severe.252 This version of the
exacting scrutiny standard functionally operates as strict scrutiny and
essentially places disclosure requirements on the chopping block, making it
incredibly hard for them to survive in court.253
Further, this form of exacting scrutiny allows little room for a balancing
of government interests and harms, which would typically allow for some
flexibility in weighing the government’s interests and the burdens on the
plaintiff.254 In the First Amendment context, exacting scrutiny requires that
“the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual burden on First Amendment rights.”255 The flexibility of this test is
beneficial because courts can apply it to any set of rights or interests, and it
provides an opportunity to appropriately give deference to state
legislatures.256 Because of the variability that exists in conducting this
248. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2385 (majority opinion).
249. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
250. Id. at 218.
251. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2399 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 64 (1976) for explaining that “unlike contribution limits, ‘disclosure requirements impose no
ceiling on campaign-related activities’ and concluding only that compelled disclosure ‘can’ infringe
associational rights”).
252. Id. at 2399.
253. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (noting that, up until about 2006,
the rate at which laws survive strict scrutiny review was between twenty-two and thirty-three
percent).
254. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207, 211–12
(2016) (noting that the Court has declared that exacting scrutiny may require narrow tailoring, but
in doing so the Court is actually applying the standard strict scrutiny test); see also Bonta, 141 S.
Ct. at 2397–98 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that, had the Court in Doe v. Reed required
narrow tailoring, it is unlikely the disclosure requirement would have survived).
255. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S.
724, 744 (2008)).
256. See Wright, supra note 254, at 214 (“[E]xacting scrutiny offers greater built-in, formal,
legitimate adaptability, or inherent flexibility, than does strict scrutiny, or than standard fixed
intermediate scrutiny, or than any version of minimum scrutiny.”); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
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balancing and proportionality test, there is a general sense of indeterminacy
in the outcome of cases.257 Such indeterminacy illuminates the importance
of maintaining a consistent and clear standard of exacting scrutiny in each
case in which a court applies it.258 Although the balancing of interests and
harms may result in varying outcomes, a clear exacting scrutiny standard at
least puts state legislatures on notice when enacting laws that pose the
possibility of burdening First Amendment rights and provides litigants with
a foundation on which to rest their challenges and defenses.259 To make the
standard even more muddled, the Court noted that, although exacting scrutiny
does not require that the law be the least restrictive means of achieving the
governmental interests, it does instruct that the law cannot be overbroad.260
“Overbroad” is an unclear term that requires the court to predict how the law
would apply in other situations outside of the one before them,261 so this
standard makes it even more difficult for states to craft laws that protect the
public and survive in court.262
B. Judicial Restraint: The Court’s Failure to Properly Weigh States’
Interests in Enacting Disclosure Laws
The Bonta majority failed to properly weigh and give deference to
California’s interest in enacting its Schedule B requirement as required by
exacting scrutiny.263 The Court erroneously focused on how often Schedule
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (holding that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed
to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty
and plausibility of the justification raised”).
257. Wright, supra note 254, at 227–28.
258. See id. at 231 (“The basic problem . . . is not actually one of judicial unpredictability. . . .
Rather, the basic problem with the standard formulations of exacting scrutiny is the inherent lack of
institutional legal guidance in characterizing, let alone resolving, the various arguably relevant
moral, practical, predictive, scientific and other empirical, statistical, and deeply prudential
problems that attend constitutional adjudication.”).
259. See id. at 214–15 (“[G]iven the availability of exacting scrutiny, there is no reason for a
court to change the formal test, or the formal level or degree of constitutional scrutiny, depending
upon the rights and interests thought to be at stake in the particular case.”).
260. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2384 (2021).
261. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (“In the First Amendment context,
however, this Court recognizes a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n.6 (2008)); see id. at 473–77 (engaging
in a lengthy analysis as to how broadly to construe a statute banning the depiction of animal cruelty
in order to determine its constitutionality).
262. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1303 (2007)
(“Not surprisingly, uncertainty and confusion have arisen about which version the Court will apply
in cases in which differences among the tests would result in different outcomes.”).
263. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2401–02 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Bs are actually used in investigations rather than the overall governmental
interest in collecting Schedule B forms.264 The Court acknowledged that
“California has an important interest in preventing wrongdoing by charitable
organizations,” especially considering that “[t]he Attorney General receives
complaints each month that identify a range of misconduct” by charitable
organizations.265 These complaints include “misuse, misappropriation, and
diversion of charitable assets, to false and misleading charitable
solicitations, to other improper activities by charities soliciting charitable
donations.”266 The Court even conceded that “[s]uch offenses cause serious
social harms” and “the Attorney General is the primary law enforcement
officer charged with combating them under California law.”267 However, the
Court diminished the significance of these governmental interests by
overemphasizing that the Attorney General only used Schedule Bs in small
number of cases, could access similar information using alternative methods,
and merely preferred access to Schedule Bs to ease administrative burdens.268
Where the legislature has particular expertise in an area of regulation,
such as managing charitable organizations, courts should defer to legislative
judgments.269 However, the majority placed too little weight on testimony
from California officials that Schedule Bs have been useful in several
investigations of charitable fraud in the past.270 Policing charitable fraud is a
legitimate governmental interest.271 Schedule B information helped
California detect charitable fraud in an organization “serving animals after
264. Id. at 2387 (majority opinion) (“California casts a dragnet for sensitive donor information
from tens of thousands of charities each year, even though that information will become relevant in
only a small number of cases involving filed complaints.”).
265. Id. at 2385–86.
266. Id. at 2386.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2386–87.
269. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 230 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]here a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example,
in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments.”
(quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 285 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting))); see also Crawford,
553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits
of possible changes to their election codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a
severe and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a
particular class. Judicial review of their handiwork must apply an objective, uniform standard that
will enable them to determine, ex ante, whether the burden they impose is too severe.”)
270. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2018); Bonta, 141 S.
Ct. at 2386.
271. See Scams and Safety, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-andcrimes/charity-and-disaster-fraud (last visited Nov. 27, 2021); Federal Trade Commission, FTC and
States Combat Fraudulent Charities that Falsely Claim to Help Veterans and Servicemembers, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (July 19, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/07/ftcstates-combat-fraudulent-charities-falsely-claim-help.
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Hurricane Katrina,” as well as fraud in a cancer charity and other non-profit
organizations.272 Moreover, California demonstrated that access to Schedule
B information provided a more efficient and effective means of investigating
charitable fraud.273 Members of the Charitable Trusts Section testified that
access to Schedule B information obviates the need for a subpoena, which
protects the integrity of an investigation.274 Subpoenas give organizations
upfront notice that law enforcement is interested in their business matters,
which provides them time to hide assets, destroy documents, and tamper with
the investigation.275 In addition, obtaining a Schedule B through an audit
letter is time-consuming, expensive, and provides charities with time to
fabricate records and engage in dilatory tactics.276
Courts have held that these interests support a conclusion that Schedule
B disclosure requirements bear a substantial relation to a sufficiently
important government interest.277 The Supreme Court, in particular, has
acknowledged the substantial government interest in disclosure requirements
before weighing those interests against potential First Amendment
burdens.278 Placing more weight on personal liberties at the expense of a
state’s interests is appropriate in instances of egregious rights violations.279
However, where the government interest is in the public good, like
preventing wealthy organizations from exploiting vulnerable populations, the
272. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1011.
273. Id. at 1012.
274. Id. at 1010.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1010–11.
277. See, e.g., Ctr. for Competitive Pol. v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1317 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The
Attorney General has provided justifications for employing a disclosure requirement instead of
issuing subpoenas. She argues that having immediate access to Form 990 Schedule B increases her
investigative efficiency, and that reviewing significant donor information can flag suspicious
activity.”); Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2018) (agreeing with the
state that “[b]ecause [f]raud is . . . often revealed not by a single smoking gun but by a pattern of
suspicious behavior, disclosure of the Schedule B can be essential to New York’s interest in
detecting fraud” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
278. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that the
governmental interests sought in enacting disclosure requirements include increasing transparency,
deterring actual corruption, and recordkeeping and reporting as a “means of gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the [law]”); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198–99 (2010)
(acknowledging that disclosure laws help prevent fraud that is “otherwise difficult to detect” and
promotes transparency and accountability); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
370 (2010) (discussing how disclosure requirements can provide citizens with “the information
needed to hold corporations and election officials accountable”).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny
of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As
a plurality of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, our Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973))).
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Court should give it substantial weight.280 Instead, the Court diminished
California’s legitimate interests by criticizing the ways in which the Attorney
General conducted investigations of charitable fraud and unnecessarily put
the public good at risk.281
C. Balancing Concrete Harms and Legitimate Interests
Exacting scrutiny requires that litigants show “a reasonable probability
that the compelled disclosure of . . . contributors’ names will subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals.”282 These harms must be concrete and
objective rather than speculative and subjective.283 The Supreme Court has
considered whether an alleged threat or harassment is substantiated or merely
hypothetical when determining how much weight it deserves in the exacting
scrutiny analysis.284 This analysis is imperative in order to determine whether
an exacting scrutiny standard requiring narrow tailoring applies.285
In Bonta, the Court neglected to inquire whether the Law Center or the
Foundation experienced substantial harms as a result of the California law
before considering whether to apply narrow tailoring.286 Instead, the Court
suggested that disclosure requirements are inherently overly burdensome on
First Amendment freedoms.287 Although disclosure requirements are not
intrinsically free of any First Amendment infringements,288 it is often unclear
how a disclosure regime will impact associational rights.289 The Court in
Buckley suggested that, although public disclosure of donors will deter some

280. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (noting that disclosure requirements may burden
political speech, but the significant governmental interests in providing the public with transparency
in electoral spending outweighs that burden).
281. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021).
282. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
283. Larid v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
284. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70–71.
285. See supra notes 241–248 and accompanying text.
286. See Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2394 (assuming that disclosure requirements were inherently
burdensome).
287. Id. at 2388.
288. See supra note 69.
289. See Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2393–94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “privacy can be
particularly important to ‘dissident’ groups because the risk of retaliation against their supporters
may be greater . . . [but] [f]or groups that promote mainstream goals and ideas, on the other hand,
privacy may not be important at all”); see also Timothy J. McClimon, Should Nonprofits Be
Required to Publicly Disclose Their Donors?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timothyjmcclimon/2019/09/16/should-nonprofits-be-required-topublicly-disclose-their-donors/?sh=d33b9a1528a2 (discussing how some nonprofit leaders
“disclose all their donors unequivocally, and do not accept anonymous contributions[,] [while]
[o]thers respect the right of donors to be private, and worr[y] that some donors might shy away from
supporting their organization if their gifts were made public”).
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individuals who may otherwise contribute and may subject some contributors
to harassment or retaliation, there must be “record evidence of the sort
proffered in NAACP v. Alabama.”290
The Court failed to recognize the stark differences between the threats
posed by the laws in NAACP v. Alabama and Shelton v. Tucker and the
California disclosure law in Bonta.291 Both NAACP v. Alabama and Shelton
were set in the political climate of the Jim Crow South when people of color
and those associated with the Civil Rights Movement faced state-sanctioned
violence on a day-to-day basis.292 In NAACP v. Alabama, the law requiring
the NAACP to disclose the names of its members to the Alabama Attorney
General exposed them to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other [forms] of public hostility.”293 The Court
reasonably concluded that the threats could prompt members to disassociate
from the NAACP and deter others from joining.294 Similarly, in holding that
the disclosure law unduly burdened associational rights, the Court in Shelton
emphasized that the required disclosure of every teachers’ associational tie
could be used by the school board to fire those who belonged to unpopular
or minority organizations, like the NAACP.295 The Shelton Court also held
that the harms were substantiated because members of the Capital Citizens
Council, an organization in support of school segregation, had testified that
the group intended to access teachers’ affidavits and eliminate any teacher
from the school who supported organizations that were unpopular with the
Council.296 These threats infringed upon both the teacher’s associational
rights and their freedom to contract because it was known that the legislature
used disclosure information to make hiring and firing decisions each year.297
It was clear that disclosure of NAACP membership in the South created a

290. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam).
291. See infra notes 292–306 and accompanying text.
292. See Emma Waitzman, Free Ride on the Freedom Ride: How “Dark Money” Nonprofits Are
Using Cases from the Civil Rights Era to Skirt Disclosure Laws, 100 TEX. L. REV. 115, 130 (2022)
(discussing the substantial threats that those associated with the NAACP and other civil rights
groups faced during the 1950s); see also Massive Resistance, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE,
https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/report/massive-resistance.html (“After the local council
circulated the roster of NAACP members in Clarendon County, South Carolina, those listed
promptly lost their jobs, credit, and suppliers. . . . [B]ombings claimed the lives of NAACP
activists . . . . [S]tates passed some 230 laws . . . [that] explicitly barred NAACP members from
public employment, especially as school teachers[,] [and] the NAACP and its members were
harassed with criminal prosecutions and bar association disciplinary proceedings . . . .”).
293. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
294. Id. at 463.
295. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486–87, 490 (1960).
296. Id. at 486 n.7.
297. Id. at 482, 485–86.
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deterrent effect.298 Because of the environment of extreme violence and
hatred towards Civil Rights activists, the NAACP’s membership in the South
decreased by 50,000 between 1950 and 1957.299 The NAACP described in
its brief to the Court that its members had lost their jobs, experienced physical
violence, and had even lost their lives because of their affiliation with the
organization.300 By striking down the laws in NAACP v. Alabama and
Shelton, the Court was establishing protections for people of color and those
involved in the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement.301
In Bonta, the Court relied on Civil Rights era cases to protect the
interests of a few wealthy donors and charity board members who wholly
failed to allege harms even remotely of the sort proffered in NAACP v.
Alabama and Shelton.302 The Law Center and the Foundation provided some
evidence that select members, including the CEO, COO, and members on the
Board of Directors, had received death threats for their affiliations with the
organizations.303 The Law Center and the Foundation alleged that they
received critical letters and that a donor’s business was boycotted as a result
of his association.304 The CEO and Vice President of the Foundation testified
that some prospective contributors were afraid to have their information
disclosed to the public.305 However, reliance on the fears of individual
contributors based on the nonpublic reporting requirements does not
constitute a substantial burden because they are speculative.306 Moreover, a
showing that just a few people refused to make contributions because of the
possibility of disclosure or that some people may think twice about donating
is not sufficient to establish a significant First Amendment burden.307 It
certainly does not show that disclosure would result in “the likelihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise by [their contributors] of their right to
freedom of association.”308 The potential burdens, if any, were minimal, and
they certainly did not compare to the severity of the harms that the plaintiffs

298. See Waitzman, supra note 292, at 130 (discussing the impact that disclosure had on NAACP
membership).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 130 n.95 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 15, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
301. See Waitzman, supra note 292.
302. Compare Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2018),
with Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486–87, 490, and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
303. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1015–16.
304. Id. at 1016.
305. Id. at 1013.
306. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam).
307. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1014 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72).
308. Id. (alteration in original) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
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faced in NAACP v. Alabama or Shelton.309 The employees of the Law Center
and the Foundation did not allege that they were at risk of losing their
positions as a result of submitting their Schedule B information, nor did they
show that donors were at risk of retaliation by California officials.310 By
analogizing the Law Center and the Foundation to the plaintiffs in those
cases, the Court failed to appreciate the undeniable social and economic
differences between members of the NAACP in the 1950s and 1960s who
were at risk of losing their teaching positions and experiencing violent threats
and the organizations’ members and donors in Bonta.311
The petitioners also failed to show that these harms were the result of
the disclosure requirement itself.312 The Attorney General ensured that the
Schedule B information would remain confidential and would only be used
to investigate fraud.313 When taking this into account, it is hard to see how
that requirement would be the catalyst for such burdens.314 Moreover,
information about the leaders and board members of Americans for
Prosperity Foundation is already readily accessible to the public on the
internet,315 and the petitioners failed to show that the disclosure requirement
exposes them to the threats.316 In permitting such a weak showing of harm,
the Supreme Court not only minimized the seriousness of the harms
presented in NAACP v. Alabama and Shelton, but also signaled to
organizations that they can successfully cite to any potential threat or instance

309. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2400 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
310. See id.
311. See, e.g., Gloster B. Current, The Significance of the N.A.A.C.P. and Its Impact in the 1960s,
19 BLACK SCHOLAR 9, 13 (1988) (explaining that efforts to achieve equal rights “caused reprisals
against NAACP leaders and units,” such as the bombing of an NAACP president’s home resulting
in severe injuries and the shooting of an NAACP activist during a march to stimulate voter
registration); Timothy J. Minchin, Making Best Use of the New Laws: The NAACP and the Fight
for Civil Rights in the South, 1965–1975, 74 J.S. HIST. 669, 675, 689–90 (2008) (discussing the
social isolation that NAACP lawyers experienced in the South and the racial harassment that
NAACP members faced at their places of employment, such as confronting racist graffiti and a fake
lynching of a doll).
312. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2400 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
313. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
314. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1960) (discussing how the school board’s
access to a teacher’s political ties because of the non-confidential disclosure requirement could
result in pressure to “discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations”).
315. About, AMS. FOR PROSPERITY FOUND., https://americansforprosperity.org/about/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2022).
316. See Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2381 (noting that members of the Law Center and the Foundation
had alleged that they faced threats and harassment in the past for their affiliations but failed to make
any connection between those allegations and the confidential disclosure requirement).
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of harassment to avoid disclosure, even if it is unclear how those harms
resulted from the disclosure law itself.317
The Court should have applied the exacting scrutiny balancing test and
weighed the character and magnitude of the injury to First Amendment rights
against the governmental interests that the state cites as justification for those
burdens before imposing a narrow tailoring requirement.318 In alignment
with the exacting scrutiny standard, the Court should have taken into
consideration the extent to which the governmental interests made it
necessary to burden First Amendment rights.319 The State made clear that
the Attorney General uses the Schedule B information in its investigations of
charitable fraud.320 The governmental interests in protecting the public from
charitable fraud far outweigh the slight and highly speculative burdens that
may result from handing over Schedule B information to the Attorney
General, especially given that nearly a quarter of the United States’ charitable
assets are held by charities registered in California.321 Further, when
evaluating whether there is a substantial relation between these interests and
the disclosure law as instructed by exacting scrutiny precedent, it is clear that
the law promotes the state interests.322 Thus, a narrow tailoring requirement
is not necessary.323 The Court placed far too much weight on harms that may
be wholly unrelated to the disclosure regime and disregarded the substantial
interests set forth by the Attorney General.324 By allowing unrelated harms
to support its holding, the Court has provided charitable organizations an easy
avenue to strike down any disclosure requirement, threatening the public
interest.325

317. Id.
318. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788–89 (1983)).
319. Id.; see supra Section IV.B.
320. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2018).
321. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
322. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 199 (2010) (“Public disclosure . . . promotes
transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other measures cannot. In light
of the foregoing, we . . . conclude that public disclosure . . . is substantially related to the important
interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral process.”).
323. See supra Section IV.A.
324. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2394–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
325. See infra Section IV.D.1.
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D. Dark Money: Threats to State Disclosure Requirements Are Threats
to Democracy
1. Facial Challenges Threaten All State Disclosure Requirements
The Bonta Court made hasty generalizations in striking down the
California disclosure law as facially unconstitutional.326 The Court held that
every demand of disclosure runs the risk of chilling, or deterring,
associational rights, and a mere risk or possibility of deterrence is enough to
constitute a burden on First Amendment rights.327 In doing so, the Court
struck down the California disclosure requirement as overbroad and held that
it failed exacting scrutiny in every application.328 The Court discarded the
requirement that litigants show actual harm329 and inappropriately exercised
its power by enjoining the lawful application of a disclosure requirement
simply because it “might be unlawful as-applied in other circumstances.”330
Moreover, the Court failed to make any distinctions between 501(c)(3)
organizations and other organizations that are allowed to engage in political
spending.331 The Court’s analysis “marks reporting and disclosure
requirements with a bull’s-eye.”332
It is difficult to imagine how any state disclosure requirement can
withstand this new, stricter standard.333
In Citizens United v.
Schneiderman,334 the Second Circuit applied exacting scrutiny to a New York
disclosure requirement instructing 501(c)(3) and (4) organizations to submit
a set of yearly disclosures to the Attorney General.335 The Second Circuit
held that the Attorney General had a legitimate interest in collecting Schedule
B forms to investigate charitable fraud, in part, because collecting this
information “facilitate[d] investigative efficiency.”336 The court held that the
possibility of harm in the event of accidental public disclosure could not
outweigh those interests.337 Had this case come before the Second Circuit

326. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2387 (majority opinion).
327. Id. at 2383.
328. Id. at 2387.
329. Id. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 2390 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
331. See id. at 2384 (majority opinion) (holding that all disclosure requirements, regardless of
who they are targeting, are subject to exacting scrutiny and “[w]here exacting scrutiny applies, the
challenged requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes”).
332. Id. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
333. See infra notes 335–347 and accompanying text.
334. 882 F.3d 374 (2018).
335. Id. at 379, 382–83.
336. Id. at 382.
337. Id. at 384–85.
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after Bonta, it may not have survived.338 The Second Circuit would have
likely rejected administrative efficiency as a sufficient government interest,
as the Supreme Court did in Bonta, and held that the possibility of public
disclosure based on the Attorney General’s past mistakes was sufficient to
outweigh any governmental interest.339
Other states’ disclosure laws are at risk under the exacting scrutiny
framework set forth in Bonta. The State of Maryland has disclosure
requirements in the electoral context.340 “[A]ny person who makes aggregate
independent expenditures of $5,000 or more in an election cycle on campaign
material” is to register with the State Board of Elections.341 A “person”
includes an individual, an association, a corporation, or any other
organization or group of persons.342 This Independent Expenditure Report
must include the name and address of the person making the expenditure, as
well anyone who is directing that person to make the expenditure and anyone
“who made cumulative donations of $6,000 or more to the person making the
[expenditure].”343 Although this law is targeted at organizations that do
engage in political activity and expenditures, in the event of a constitutional
challenge, a court is compelled to apply the exacting scrutiny standard set
forth in Bonta.344 If the plaintiff showed even the slightest harm, Maryland
would have a high bar to meet in showing that the substantial governmental
interest in enforcing this law justifies those burdens.345 The threat to
disclosure regimes like this one inhibits states from monitoring charitable and
electoral spending to protect the integrity of their elections.346 The Court’s
holding threatens to put all campaign expenditures in the dark.347
2. Dark Money and Democracy
The Supreme Court has long recognized that transparency in the
electoral context is a compelling and substantial governmental interest
because it provides for an informed electorate and prevents corruption of the

338. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
340. Independent Expenditure Requirements, MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS,
https://elections.maryland.gov/campaign_finance/independent_expenditures.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2021); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-306(b).
341. MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-306(b).
342. Id. § 13-306(a)(5)(i).
343. Id. § 13-306(e).
344. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (holding that all
disclosure requirements must be “narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest”).
345. See id.
346. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
347. See infra Section IV.D.2.
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political process.348 The Bonta decision does not explicitly diminish that
principle, but it has the potential to cast another veil on big spending in
elections.349 Although 501(c)(3) organizations are not permitted to engage
in political activity, this decision is not exclusive to disclosure requirements
for 501(c)(3) organizations;350 it created a stricter standard for all disclosure
requirements, regardless of the organizations they target.351
Big spending in elections is spending by wealthy corporations,
charitable organizations, political groups, or individuals that is meant to
influence its outcome.352 Big spending is a legitimate concern for the
legislature, the Court, and the general public because this spending, whether
it be directly to a candidate or through a charity or political action committee,
allows the wealthy to unfairly influence elections.353 Although the Court has
struck down expenditure limits in campaigns,354 the “concern over the
corrosive influence of concentrated . . . wealth” in politics is still very
relevant and “reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity
of the marketplace of political ideas.”355
Dark money is any political spending that is “meant to influence the
decision of a voter,” where the donor’s identity is not disclosed and the source
of the funding is unknown to the public.356 Because political organizations
are not legally obligated to disclose their donors, many choose not to and,
thus, qualify as dark money groups.357 This spending may also consist of
“outside spending,” which is defined as political expenditures made by
corporations, unions, and individuals independent of any candidate.358 Since
Citizens United, organizations that are not political parties are permitted to
accept unlimited sums of money from individuals, corporations, or unions
and use those donations to engage in political activities, including buying

348. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 69–70 (1976) (per curiam); see supra notes 90–91 and
accompanying text.
349. See supra Section IV.D.1.
350. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2373.
351. Id. at 2389.
352. Influence
of
Big
Money,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/reform-money-politics/influence-big-money (last visited
Nov. 16, 2021).
353. Karl Evers-Hillstrom et al., More Money, Less Transparency: A Decade Under Citizens
United, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/a-decade-undercitizens-united.
354. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
355. Federal Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986).
356. Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/darkmoney/dark-moneybasics.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
357. Id.
358. Id.
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advertisements that advocate for or against a candidate, going door to door to
campaign, or running phone banks.359 Further, the Federal Election
Commission only requires disclosure of persons who contributed $1,000 or
more to groups running electioneering communications.360 However,
disclosure is only required if the donor specifically designates the
contribution for electioneering communications,361 allowing donors to avoid
disclosure by contributing to an organization for general purposes rather than
designating the money for political advertisements.362 The Court could not
have predicted the explosion of outside spending that erupted after its
decision in Citizens United.363 Organizations that do not disclose their donors
increased their political spending from less than $5.2 million in 2006 to well
over $300 million in the 2012 presidential cycle and more than $174 million
in the 2014 midterms.364 Since 2008, $1 billion of campaign contributions
consist of dark money.365 Both parties accept dark money: In 2020,
Democrats received over $500 million in dark contributions, while
Republicans accepted almost $200 million.366
Dark money, in conjunction with unlimited outside spending on
political campaigns, allows the super-wealthy to influence elections, and the
lack of disclosure prevents voters from knowing who is attempting to
influence their political decisions.367 Much of the country cannot counteract
the influence of wealthy donors because the majority of voters cannot afford
to donate such large sums of money to charitable organizations, political
359. Id.; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“The appearance
of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition,
an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated
with a candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try
to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.
This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse ‘to take part in democratic
governance’ because of additional political speech made by a corporation or any other speaker.”
(citation omitted) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003))).
360. How To Report Electioneering Communications, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/other-filers/electioneering-communications/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
361. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).
362. Why Our Democracy Needs Disclosure, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Aug. 17, 2011),
https://campaignlegal.org/update/why-our-democracy-needs-disclosure.
363. See infra notes 364–366.
364. Political
Nonprofits
(Dark
Money),
OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
365. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Dark Money in the 2020 Election, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov.
20, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/dark-money-2020-election.
366. Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, ‘Dark Money’ Topped $1 Billion in 2020, Largely
Boosting
Democrats,
OPENSECRETS
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/03/one-billion-dark-money-2020-electioncycle/.
367. Influence of Big Money, supra note 352.
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campaigns, or PACs.368 This is especially true for marginalized communities
because the concentration of wealth in the United States is largely in the
hands of the white male demographic.369 Members of marginalized
communities are also underrepresented in political positions of power and
face huge disparities in their control of wealth.370 Thus, the ideas and values
of these groups are less likely to be heard in the political arena.371 Because
tackling the wealth gap, as well as systemic racism and sexism, poses a
difficult and extensive challenge,372 ensuring that these groups are informed
about who is influencing the election is one important mechanism for
enhancing voter participation in the political process and preserving
democracy in the meantime.373 Transparency about political spending is
about “strengthening our democracy and disincentivizing both profiteering
off of public resources and the manipulation of the government for private
ends.”374 Keeping political spending in the public light also encourages
donors and political candidates to refrain from exchanging donations for
illegal actions, such as an ambassadorial appointment, a grant of a pardon, or
other political favors.375 Privacy for wealthy donors at the expense of
368. See Megan Leonhardt, The Top 1% of Americans Have About 16 Times More Wealth than
the Bottom 50%, CNBC (June 23, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/23/how-much-wealthtop-1percent-of-americans-have.html (“The wealthiest 1% of Americans controlled about $41.52
trillion in the first quarter . . . . Yet the bottom 50% of Americans only controlled about $2.62
trillion collectively, which is roughly 16 times less than those in the top 1%.”).
369. See Matthew Yglesias, The Top 1 Percent Is Very White, VOX (Apr. 29, 2014, 3:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/4/29/5665272/the-top-one-percent-is-98-percent-male (noting that
97.8% of the top 1% is male and 95.3% of the top 10% is male. 90.9% of the top 1% is white and
84.9% of the top 10% is white).
370. Id.; Allie Boldt, Putting Marginalized Communities at the Center of Money in Politics
Conversations, DEMOS (June 27, 2017), https://www.demos.org/blog/putting-marginalizedcommunities-center-money-politics-conversations.
371. Boldt, supra note 370.
372. See Vanessa Williamson, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Requires Heavy, Progressive
Taxation of Wealth, BROOKINGS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/closing-theracial-wealth-gap-requires-heavy-progressive-taxation-of-wealth/ (“Black people in America have
been systematically stripped of the wealth they have produced. Only a transformative national
agenda can address the racial wealth gap, because the disparity is the product of societal racism,
compounded over generations . . . . It is impossible, of course, to design any policy agenda that
would fully reverse the effects of centuries of racism.”).
373. See Lear Jiang, Note, Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the “Informational
Interest” Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 520–22 (2019)
(arguing that disclosure not only informs the electorate but also may also lead to more political
engagement by encouraging voters to speak out against a candidate receiving financial support from
a particular organization and “put pressure on both public officials and private actors wishing to
influence policy”).
374. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparency for Democracy’s Sake, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Dec.
21,
2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/transparencydemocracys-sake.
375. Id.
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transparency for people who do not have the means to meaningfully
contribute to charities and elections is a danger to a fair and equitable
democracy.376
3. Ability of Disclosure Requirements to Combat the Harms of Dark
Money
Even as the Supreme Court was opening the floodgates for independent
political spending, it identified and protected disclosure provisions as a
mechanism for ensuring transparency in election spending.377 The Court
mentioned that disclosure of political expenditures allows “the electorate to
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.”378 In this ever polarizing political climate, there is one issue that
most people agree with: Political corruption is a threat to democracy.379
There is ample evidence to show that wealthy corporations and individuals
attempt to persuade politicians to vote in their favor.380 Congress is less
concerned about the average constituent’s interests than they are about
business or lobbyist interests that offer hefty financial contributions.381
Elected officials are more inclined to pass laws that benefit their mega-donors
at the expense of the rest of the country.382 While the average American voter

376. See e.g., Michael Beckel, Dark Money Spending Since Citizens United Set to Eclipse $1
Billion, ISSUE ONE (Sept. 10, 2020), https://issueone.org/articles/dark-money-spending-sincecitizens-united-set-to-eclipse-1-billion/ (“When either Democrats or Republicans use dark money
to try to win elections, the American people lose. Voters want to know elected officials are listening
to them, not secretive special interest groups.”).
377. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing that disclosure
“increases the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates”); see also
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (noting that the important state
interests in upholding disclosure requirements include “providing the electorate with information,
deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary
to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions”).
378. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); see also id. at 361 (“If
elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender
their best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern. We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or
the reality of these influences.”).
379. Maggie Koerth, Everyone Knows Money Influences Politics . . . Except Scientists,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 4, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/everyone-knows-moneyinfluences-politics-except-scientists/.
380. America’s Corruption Problem, REPRESENTUS, https://represent.us/americas-corruptionproblem/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (“The opinions of 90% of Americans have essentially no impact
at all [on our elected officials’ decisions].”).
381. Id. For example, over the past ten years, the pharmaceutical industry spent $2.16 billion to
influence the government. Id. In addition, the energy industry spent $2.93 billion, the defense
industry spent $1.26 billion, and the financial industry spent $4.29 billion. Id.
382. Id.
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is distracted by false narratives about voter fraud,383 their elected officials are
engaging in genuine forms of deception.384 For example, many Democratic
candidates promise to address the student debt crisis.385 However, student
loan companies donate millions of dollars to political campaigns to pressure
lawmakers not to fix the problem so that they can continue making profits
from student loan payments.386 The problem is that the general public is
largely unaware of which politicians are accepting these sorts of donations.387
The non-profit organization RepresentUS advocates for new disclosure laws
that require “that all significant political fundraising and spending is
immediately disclosed online and made easily accessible to the public.”388
They also advocate for laws that require “any organization that spends
meaningful funds on political advertisements” to submit an “online report
disclosing its major donors.”389 However, the Supreme Court’s lack of
support for disclosure requirements in Bonta makes it clear that states will
have a difficult time using disclosure to rid their political systems of
corruption.390 Without strong state disclosure laws that limit and expose dark
money in politics, Americans will continue to vote for politicians who are
corrupted by big-moneyed interests.391
Big-moneyed interests also include charitable organizations, which
further highlights the need for disclosure requirements for all tax-exempt
entities.392 Charitable organizations contribute substantial amounts of money

383. The
Myth
of
Voter
Fraud,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/vote-suppression/mythvoter-fraud (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
384. Id.
385. See Hannah Demissie, Progressives Warn Inaction on Student Debt Could Hurt Democrats
in Midterms, ABC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/progressives-warninaction-student-debt-hurt-democrats-midterms/story?id=81986814 (“During the 2020 election,
Biden promised to forgive a minimum of $10,000 of federal student loans per borrower.”).
386. Ed Helms & Joshua Graham Lynn, To Solve Our Student Debt Crisis We Need to Fix
Political Corruption, FORTUNE (Feb. 4, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/02/04/student-debt-crisiscorruption-ed-helms/.
387. See Anti-Corruption Is What We Do, REPRESENTUS, https://represent.us/anticorruption-act/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (scroll down to “End Secret Money” and click “Immediately disclose
political money online”) (“Many donations are not disclosed for months, and some are never made
available electronically, making it difficult for citizens and journalists to follow the money in our
political system.”).
388. Id.
389. Id. (click “Stop donors from hiding behind secret-money groups”).
390. See supra Section IV.D.1.
391. See The Strategy to End Corruption, REPRESENTUS, https://represent.us/the-strategy-toend-corruption/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (noting that state laws that expose the source of campaign
donations will allow Americans to “know who is buying political power”).
392. See infra notes 394–403 and accompanying text.
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to campaigns, lobbying groups, and candidates themselves,393 but there is a
lack of transparency of this spending because organizations that are permitted
to engage in some level of political activity are not subject to disclosure.394
501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from participating in campaign
activities directly or indirectly, while 501(c)(4) organizations are permitted
to engage in some political campaign activity as long as it is not its main
purpose.395 However, the IRS does not specify how much political
engagement is too much.396 Because 501(c)(4) organizations are not political
organizations, they are not required to disclose their donors to the IRS at
all.397 Even 501(c)(3) organizations that often advocate for specific political
views which can, in turn, influence voter decisions, are not required to
publicly disclose their donors.398 For example, the NAACP, Center for
American Progress, and the Natural Resources Defense Council are all
examples of 501(c)(3) organizations.399 Defending Democracy Together, the
National Rifle Association, and Planned Parenthood are 501(c)(4)
organizations.400 Even though many of these organizations have separate
393. Non-Profits,
Foundations
&
Philanthropy,
OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=W02 (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
394. See supra Section II.B.1.
395. See supra Section II.B.1.
396. See supra Section II.B.1.
397. See supra Section II.B.1.
398. See supra Section II.B.1.
399. NAACP, https://naacp.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2021) (“We work to disrupt inequality,
dismantle racism, and accelerate change in key areas including criminal justice, health care,
education,
climate
and
the
economy.”);
CTR.
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS,
https://americanprogress.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2021) (“We develop new policy ideas,
challenge the media to cover the issues that truly matter, and shape the national debate.”); NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/how-we-work#advocacy (last visited Nov. 16, 2021)
(“Creating blueprints for lasting environmental change isn’t enough. We have to persuade decision
makers to adopt those innovative solutions, so NRDC’s advocates work at every level, from mayors’
offices to the halls of Congress to international negotiating tables.”).
400. DEFENDING
DEMOCRACY
TOGETHER,
https://www.defendingdemocracytogether.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2021) (“We are
dedicated to defending America’s democratic norms, values, and institutions and fighting for
consistent conservative principles like rule of law, free trade, and expanding legal immigration.”);
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-are (last visited
Nov. 16, 2021) (“Planned Parenthood has 17 million supporters nationwide – activists and donors
committed to helping us promote policies that protect and advance access to a full range of sexual
and reproductive care and education.”); NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2021) (considering itself “a major political force and . . . America’s foremost
defender of Second Amendment rights”); see also Aaron Kessler, Why the NRA is So Powerful on
Capitol
Hill,
By
the
Numbers,
CNN
(Feb.
23,
2018,
2:12
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/23/politics/nra-political-money-clout/index.html
(“[E]ight
lawmakers have been on the receiving end of at least $1 million in campaign contributions from the
NRA over the courses of their careers.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 365 (“In the last presidential
election in 2016, the National Rifle Association (NRA) made waves being the biggest dark money
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funds that are registered as political action committees,401 their 501(c)(3) and
(4) counterparts are dedicated to influencing the views of voters and the
actions of Congress.402 Thus, disclosure laws ensure that these organizations
are not misusing funds and acting outside of the scope of IRS guidelines.403
Organizations like 501(c)(4)’s who do not disclose their donors “use[]
a range of tactics to underreport their political activities to the IRS.”404
501(c)(4) organizations appear to meet the “requirements for promoting
social welfare” when in actuality they are spending large sums of money on
political activities.405 Some organizations classify expenditures that support
or criticize candidates “as ‘lobbying,’ ‘education,’ or ‘issue advocacy’ on
their tax returns” to avoid disclosure.406 ProPublica compared applications
of seventy-two 501(c)(4) organizations with tax returns they filed at a later
date.407 They found that thirty-two groups that initially noted that they did
not engage in political activity later “filed tax returns showing they had done
the opposite.”408 Because the IRS does not specify how much political
activity engagement is too much for 501(c)(4) organizations, there are
seemingly no consequences for these organizations that spend large sums of
spender, spending $54 million.”); Massoglia & Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 366 (“Anti-Trump
501(c)(4) nonprofit Defending Democracy Together also chipped in, spending more than $15
million opposing Trump or boosting Biden.”).
401. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Action Fund, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (stating that its purpose is “to advance access to sexual health care and
defend reproductive rights”); NRA-PVF Political Victory Fund, https://www.nrapvf.org/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022) (“The NRA Political Victory Fund (NRA-PVF) is NRA’s political action
committee. The NRA-PVF ranks political candidates—irrespective of party affiliation—based on
their voting records, public statements and their responses to an NRA—PVF questionnaire.”).
402. See supra notes 399–401.
403. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Strikes Down Calif. Law Requiring Charities to
Disclose Top Donors to Attorney General, WASH. POST (July 1, 2021, 4:25 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-california-charitydonors/2021/07/01/787d5c16-da6b-11eb-9bbb-37c30dcf9363_story.html.
404. Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call It Public Welfare,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:25 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofitsspend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. In 2008, American Future Fund reported to the IRS that it would not participate in
politics. Id. Later, they “uploaded an ad to YouTube” supporting a Republican Senator. Id. The
group later reported “$8 million in political spending in 2010.” Id. Similarly, the “Republican
Jewish Coalition told the FEC it spent more than $1.1 million on political ads,” none of which was
reported to the IRS. Id. The grants and “political advertising made up almost 40 percent of the total
expenditures of the group.” Id. The chair of the Coalition is a GOP super donor and casino tycoon
Sheldon Adelson. Id. The Adelsons spent $92 million on GOP candidates in 2012 and $20 million
on Trump’s campaign in 2016. Christine Mai-Duc & Jazmine Ulloa, These Are the Billionaires
Hoping to Influence Elections that Will Determine Control of Congress, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-midterm-election-billionaires-20181105-story.html.
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money on politics.409 It is clear that some 501(c)(3) and (4) groups are
influencing elections by spending heavily on campaigns and the Federal
Election Commission is not adequately monitoring this spending.410 IRS
officials have admitted that the rules surrounding what charitable
organizations can do “are vague and difficult to enforce.”411 Disclosure
requirements are key to providing the public oversight that the IRS clearly
cannot.412
Ultimately, the Bonta Court should have preserved the exacting scrutiny
standard as set forth in its prior disclosure cases, requiring the law to have a
substantial relation to a sufficiently important government interest.413 In
applying that standard, it should have given due deference to the significant
governmental interest in preventing charitable fraud and acknowledged the
importance of disclosure regimes as it has in precedential cases.414 As a
result, the Court should have ruled that the petitioners’ speculative and
unrelated harms did not outweigh those significant interests and, thus, held
that the disclosure requirement was constitutional.415 In doing so, the Court
should have reiterated the importance of disclosure to preserve transparency
of political spending and the integrity of the American political system.416
V. CONCLUSION
States should have the opportunity to create disclosure requirements that
protect donors from threats, harassments, or reprisal while ensuring that nonpolitical organizations like Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the
409. See John D. Colombo, The I.R.S. Should Eliminate 501(c)(4) Organizations, N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/15/does-the-irs-scandal-provethat-501c4s-should-be-eliminated/the-irs-should-eliminate-501c4-organizations (“The problem
with the (c)(4) designation is that it is essentially a charity that is permitted to engage in unlimited
lobbying and some significant amount of political campaign activity (as long as that activity isn’t
the organization’s ‘primary purpose’) in exchange for denying the organization the ability to receive
deductible charitable organizations. But the Internal Revenue Service will never be able to
satisfactorily police the line at which political activity becomes ‘primary.’”).
410. See supra Section II.B.1.
411. Eric Lichtblau, I.R.S. Expected to Stand Aside as Nonprofits Increase Role in 2016 Race,
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/us/politics/irs-expected-to-standaside-as-nonprofits-increase-role-in-2016-race.html (“Audits for excessive campaign work are
extremely rare, even for groups spending huge chunks of their budgets to support candidates.
Complaints about abuses can languish for years, records show. With scant enforcement, some
nonprofits have become huge political operations.”).
412. See supra notes 270–273 (noting that disclosure requirements can serve as a mechanism to
police charitable fraud).
413. See supra Section IV.A.
414. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
415. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
416. See supra Section IV.D.
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Thomas More Law Center are not using their donations for inappropriate
endeavors, like political activities. The Supreme Court made that
increasingly difficult by establishing a new version of exacting scrutiny that
defied decades of precedent.417 The Bonta majority placed the associational
rights of wealthy donors above the fundamental tenets of democracy and
improperly encroached on the state’s ability to exercise its authority to
protect the public from charitable fraud.418 Also imperative is the important
public interest in protecting disclosure requirements in the electoral
process.419 If the United States is to have free, fair, and transparent elections,
the right of the public to know who is exercising influence over their vote
and who they are voting for is crucial.420 By requiring the application of a
stricter standard to all disclosure laws, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta has threatened the survival of existing and
future disclosure laws that regulate election spending, and, in turn, it has
threatened democracy.421

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Part IV.

